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The role of the Mexican maquiladora has 
changed greatly in recent years, but the 
basics remain the same. The typical plant 
is foreign owned and engaged in labor-
intensive assembly of intermediate or final 
goods.1 The vast majority of inputs are 
brought from the U.S. or another country, 
and the output is usually sold in the U.S. 
Maquiladoras are an extension into 
Mexico of U.S. production of automobiles, 
electronics, apparel and many other goods. 
They’re a major engine of growth in cities 
along the U.S.–Mexico border, where the 
plants are concentrated. Economic benefits 
spill into neighboring U.S. cities, creating 
jobs in manufacturing, warehousing, trans-
portation, logistics, real estate services and 
major border protection programs.2
These general characteristics are well 
known, but a lack of data has limited our 
understanding of the distribution of ma-
quiladora activity. Recently, the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), 
Mexico’s chief statistical agency, provided 
previously unpublished information that 
will allow us to draw a more detailed por-
trait of an industry that employs 1.2 million 
workers, accounting for about a third of 
Mexico’s manufacturing jobs.3 
We take a preliminary look at where 
specific maquiladora activities take place 
within Mexico. Then we examine changes 
in location since 1990, finding that the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and other trade pacts have been 
the most important factors reshaping pat-
terns of maquiladora employment.  
Maquiladora Location and Activity
Mexico created the Border Industri-
alization Program in 1965 to promote ma-
quiladoras, initially restricting plants to a 
20-kilometer-deep strip along the U.S.–Mex-
ico border. The original maquiladora cities 
were Matamoros, Juárez, Nuevo Laredo and 
Tijuana. Mexico relaxed location restrictions 
in the early 1970s, allowing the program 
to expand into the interior, except for such 
congested and highly industrialized regions 
as Monterrey and Mexico City. All restric-
tions disappeared by the early 1990s.
The INEGI data allow us to profile ma-
quiladora activity for 1990, 2000 and 2006, 
showing the percentage of employment 
by city and region, based on total hours 
worked. The year 2000 marked the division 
between a long period of virtually uninter-
rupted industry expansion and a period of 
much slower job growth or even decline.  
The slowdown started with the U.S. re-
cession in 2001. The slump converged with 
potent foreign competition from China, the 
Caribbean and elsewhere to cut maquila-
dora employment by 298,000 jobs, or 22.1 
percent, in 17 months. 
As the industry evolved, it became ap-
parent that permanent job losses were con-
centrated in the lowest-skill, lowest-wage 
sectors. With the maquiladora industry 
shifting to higher-wage, higher-productivity 
operations, the pace of recovery fell back 
on Mexico’s long-standing competitive ad-
vantages, such as proximity to the U.S., an 
experienced and skilled workforce and a 
stable political system.4 
INEGI has tracked 17 principal maqui-
ladora cities for many years. They made up 
78.4 percent of maquiladora hours worked 
in 1990 but only 66.4 percent by 2000 and 
67.9 percent in 2006 (Table 1). 
Eleven of the 17 cities are on the U.S.–
Mexico border, and their collective employ-
ment share went from 70.3 percent in 1990 
to 56.7 percent by 2000 and 61.1 percent by 
2006. For the six cities on the Texas–Mexico 
border, the combined share of maquiladora 
employment fell from 45.6 percent in 1990 
to 38.4 percent in 2006. Juárez’s share of 
maquiladora work has fallen since 1990, but 
it remains the No. 1 employer among the 17 
cities. Gaining share, Reynosa has risen to 
third; losing share, Matamoros has sunk to 
fifth. In 2006, California border cities Tijua-
na at 13.8 percent and Mexicali at 4.6 per-
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Table 1 
Maquiladora Employment Patterns Shifting
Share of total hours worked    Employment*
      1990     2000     2006   2006
17 principal cities 78.4 66.4 67.9   837,828
Other cities 21.6 33.6 32.1   396,471
Border cities 70.3 56.7 61.1   753,846
Texas border 45.6 33.0 38.4   474,434
California border 18.9 20.0 19.2   236,968
Arizona border 5.8 3.7 3.4   42,398
Interior cities 8.1 9.7 6.8   83,982
Border interior 7.0 7.2 6.4   79,276
Distant interior 1.1 2.5 .4   4,706
Texas border cities
Juárez 25.1 17.9 20.6 253,937
Reynosa 5.3 5.1 8.3 101,882
Matamoros 7.4 4.7 4.4 54,208
Acuña 3.2 2.4 2.6   32,579
Nuevo Laredo 3.0 1.7 1.8   22,036
Piedras Negras 1.6 1.1 .8   9,774
Nation 100 100 100 1,234,299
*Full-time-equivalent employment, based on annual hours worked per city, divided by annual hours per employee. Annual hours per em-
ployee is based on 44 hours a week and a standard vacation and holiday schedule.
NOTE: Numbers may not total due to rounding.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía; authors’ calculations.
cent filled the No. 2 and No. 4 positions.5
What do maquiladoras produce by 
city? Juárez was always an important center 
for automobile-related parts and compo-
nents, and Tijuana specialized in consumer 
and business electronics. However, the new 
INEGI data offer a broader look at the dis-
tribution of maquiladora activity by sector.6 
For the 17 cities, we looked at the two 
largest sectors in 1990 and 2006 and found 
evidence of greater geographical diversity. 
On average, the largest sector accounted for 
44.2 percent of employment in 1990 and 
38.8 percent in 2006. The top two sectors 
totaled 67.3 percent of employment in 1990 
and 62.1 percent in 2006.7 
In both 1990 and 2006, three sectors 
dominated activity on the Texas border—
electronics, transportation equipment and 
electrical machinery (Table 2). This holds on a 
broader scale as well; one of these three sec-
tors was the largest in 12 of the 17 principal 
cities in 1990 and 13 of them in 2006. And one 
was the No. 2 sector in 10 cities in both years.
On the Texas border, output in elec-
tronics and electrical machinery is more 
closely related to auto parts. Most electron-
ics maquiladoras on the California border 
are under Asian ownership and make prod-
ucts for the home, such as televisions and 
CD players, or for businesses, such as print-
ers and copiers.     
Exceptions to the top three sectors ap-
pear in several places—for example, the 
furniture sector helps explain the size of 
the wood and metal products category on 
the California border in 1990. Services can 
range from call centers or coupon process-
ing to sophisticated engineering and testing. 
The catchall “other manufacturing” category 
has grown in recent years as a result of 
diversifying maquiladora activities and the 
inability to fit some activities neatly in an 
aging industrial classification system.  
Textiles and apparel appears as a domi-
nant sector in three cities in 1990 but only 
in Torreón in 2006. However, the sector is 
the largest in the “other cities” category in 
both 1990 and 2006—a fact explained by the 
industry move to nonmaquiladora cities in 
Mexico’s interior.    
Trade Deals as Catalyst
Well-known factors drive the overall 
growth of the maquiladora industry—
among them, the U.S. industrial sector’s 
performance, exchange rates, access to 
U.S. markets and competition from low-
wage nations. As we examine the indus-
try’s changing location within Mexico, it 
becomes clear that two other factors are 
important—geography and trade policy. 
First, some sectors had already selected 
cities based on location. Auto suppliers 
wanted the best access to the U.S. heartland 
and often chose cities on the Texas border. 
Consumer electronics firms needed access 
to Asian suppliers, making California cities 
a logical choice. The apparel sector opted 
for the lower wages of central Mexico. 
For 17 cities, we looked 
at the two largest sectors 
in 1990 and 2006 and 
found evidence of greater 
geographical diversity. On 
average, the largest sector 
accounted for 44.2 percent 
of employment in 1990 
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These historical patterns linked many cities’ 
performance to specific sectors.   
Second, changing trade rules deter-
mined the relative success of specific sec-
tors. The past 25 years have seen rapid trade 
liberalization as Mexico turned away from 
the strong protectionist policies of the 1980s. 
NAFTA in 1994, the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act of 2000, the end of the 
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in 2005 and 
competition from low-wage Asian labor fol-
lowed, bringing shifting international forces.
The maquiladora industry’s sensitivity 
to the trade agreements is logical. Dating to 
the 1960s, these operations were an early 
example of how multinational companies 
could use cross-border production sharing 
to reduce wage costs. In Mexico, the loca-
tion of these plants is often based on short-
term and local advantages, and their ties to 
Table 2
Key Sectoral Changes in Maquiladora Cities
(Hours worked)
Largest sector 1990 Percent 
share Largest sector 2006 Percent 
share
17 principal cities Electronics 29.2 Electronics 25.8
Other cities Textiles and apparel 21.9 Textiles and apparel 37.0
Border cities
Texas border Transportation equipment 28.1 Transportation equipment 31.7
California border Electronics 36.0 Electronics 26.1
Arizona border Electronics 54.0 Electronics 45.6
Texas border cities
Juárez Electronics 31.1 Transportation equipment 34.8
Reynosa Electrical machinery 50.7 Electronics 26.0
Matamoros Transportation equipment 32.6 Transportation equipment 31.6
Acuña Transportation equipment 29.8 Transportation equipment 57.5
Nuevo Laredo Transportation equipment 31.7 Transportation equipment 40.0
Piedras Negras Textiles and apparel 39.2 Electrical machinery 36.0
Interior cities
Border interior Transportation equipment 42.7 Transportation equipment 33.2
Distant interior Electronics 26.1 Electronics 26.0
Nation Electronics 26.1 Electronics 22.2
Second-largest sector 1990 Percent 
share Second-largest sector 2006 Percent 
share
17 principal cities Transportation equipment 22.0 Transportation equipment 23.7
Other cities Other manufacturing 17.1 Transportation equipment 17.3
Border cities
Texas border Electronics 24.7 Electronics 24.7
California border Wood and metal products 15.5 Other manufacturing 20.4
Arizona border Other manufacturing 14.7 Other manufacturing 28.2
Texas border cities 
Juárez Transportation equipment 29.7 Electronics 27.4
Reynosa Transportation equipment 18.0 Transportation equipment 15.5
Matamoros Electrical machinery 28.7 Electronics 24.6
Acuña Services 16.6 Electrical machinery 11.6
Nuevo Laredo Other manufacturing 25.2 Other manufacturing 28.4
Piedras Negras Food processing 20.2 Electronics 23.6
Interior cities
Border interior Electronics 27.1 Electronics 21.0
Distant interior Electrical machinery 25.7 Services 18.8
Nation Transportation equipment 20.8 Transportation equipment 21.6
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía; authors’ calculations.
the community and its suppliers are few.   
Three large maquiladora sectors—tex-
tiles and apparel, electronics and transporta-
tion equipment—stand out when measuring 
the extent to which trade-related regulations 
influence location (Table 3). We look at 
these sectors by the distribution of employ-
ment across regions in 1990, 2000 and 2006, 
and by annual percentage growth rates 
from 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2006. 
The broad slowdown between periods 
isn’t peculiar to these sectors; it results from 
cyclical and structural factors common to 
the maquiladora industry. What matters as 
we look for changes in location are the dif-
ferences in these sectors’ growth rates with-
in each period—reading across rows, rather 
than comparing columns. The regional 
winners show faster growth or smaller de-
clines. The relative losers grow more slowly 
or fall off by larger amounts. 
Textiles and apparel. NAFTA opened 
a window for dramatic expansion of Mexi-
can textiles and apparel—including maqui-
ladoras in this sector.8 Before the trade pact 
took effect in 1994, the model for most U.S. 
clothing companies involved producing 
and cutting fabric in the U.S., exporting it 
for sewing and finishing and re-importing 
the final product.
Strict quotas limited each country’s 
re-imports, keeping apparel activity spread 
across a number of nations. NAFTA gave 
Mexican apparel decisive advantages by 
allowing duty-free entry into the U.S. if all 
components from the thread forward were 
of NAFTA origin. The pact also relaxed or 
eliminated many quotas. 
Mexico’s cutting and sewing sector 
boomed as companies shifted operations 
from around the world to take advantage 
of access to the large North American mar-
ket. Hours worked in textile and apparel 
maquiladoras expanded 22.9 percent a year 
between 1990 and 2000.
New trade initiatives slowly dismantled 
the edge NAFTA gave Mexican apparel ex-
ports. The Caribbean Basin trade initiative 
expanded U.S. market access to 24 low-
wage countries throughout the Caribbean 
and Central America. 
The final blow came in January 2005 
with the phase-out of the MFA, a pact that 
had sharply limited U.S. textile and apparel 
imports from India, China, Bangladesh and 
other low-cost Asian countries. Employ-
ment in Mexican apparel maquiladoras fell 
at an 8.2 percent annual rate after 2000. 
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preferences, the sector sought cities where 
producers could lower costs. Central Mex-
ico was home to the traditional Mexican 
apparel sector, with few maquiladoras, but 
foreign plants opened to take advantage of 
the region’s experienced workers and sig-
nificantly lower wages. 
In 1990, plants along the Texas, Califor-
nia and Arizona borders accounted for 43.5 
percent of maquiladora apparel production. 
By 2006, 82.7 percent of the apparel ma-
quiladora activity was in smaller cities away 
from the border. 
 Electronics. Fueled by the tech 
boom, maquiladora employment on the 
California border expanded at a 15.1 per-
cent annual rate from 1990 to 2000, making 
this area the electronic sector’s fastest-grow-
ing location.   
The expansion occurred despite re-
strictions imposed by NAFTA’s Article 303, 
which required Mexico to charge duties on 
non-NAFTA inputs entering the country. 
Mexico responded with 20 sectoral pro-
grams that selectively lowered tariffs on 
inputs that were heavily supplied from Asia. 
This kept the electronics sector moving for-
ward through 2000.  
Trends reversed after 2000, and the 
California border became the second-fastest 
shrinking region, with employment falling 
at an 8 percent annual rate. Increasing Chi-
nese competition had a lot to do with it. 
The value of a Mexican location was 
low-tariff access to U.S. markets. China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization in 
2001, however, lowered tariffs on China’s 
U.S. shipments. Production for the U.S. mar-
ket shifted from Mexico to China. In effect, 
China’s lower wages in many cases trumped 
Mexico’s proximity to the U.S.   
Transportation equipment. Autos 
dominate transportation equipment maqui-
ladoras. In the 1980s maquiladora-produced 
parts and components were mostly exported 
to U.S. assembly plants. As early as 1989, 
however, the Mexican government was ac-
tively encouraging maquiladoras to become 
suppliers to Mexico’s own assembly opera-
tions, then protected by high tariff walls. 
In the 1990s, NAFTA created a single, 
continentwide market for auto assembly and 
parts production. Integration and restructur-
ing has been extensive—and complex to the 
point of bewilderment—but the new rules 
encouraged Mexico’s auto-assembly sector to 
expand. Since 2000, new and modern plants 
spread across northern and central Mexico 
have produced about 2 million autos a year.   
Until 2000, the 17 principal cities ac-
counted for more than 80 percent of sec-
tor employment. The Texas border was at 
more than 60 percent. The sector’s border 
concentration resulted from the historical 
need to ship parts quickly and cheaply to 
plants in the U.S. Midwest.
The parts and components segment 
remains concentrated on the border, and its 
primary focus remains U.S. assembly opera-
tions. However, the post-NAFTA expansion 
of the Mexican auto sector opened new 
markets. Maquiladora suppliers are follow-
ing the modern assembly plants into non-
traditional cities such as Guanajuato, Saltillo, 
Hermosillo, Silao and Aguascalientes. 
Since 2000, transportation equipment 
sector employment has shifted toward 
nontraditional maquiladora cities, where 
employment has grown at a 10.6 percent 
annual rate, compared with no change in 
Table 3
Trade Agreements’ Impact on Three Sectors
(Hours worked)
Textiles and apparel Percent share Annual percent growth
1990 2000 2006 1990–2000 2000–06
17 principal cities 53.9 20.5 17.8 11.6 −10.4
Border cities 
Texas border 27.8 5.9 4.6 5.3 −11.8
California border 9.7 3.7 5.2 11.5 −2.8
Arizona border 6.0 .8 1.3 .9 −1.3
Interior cities
Border interior 8.5 6.1 6.2 19.1 −8.0
Distant interior 1.9 4.0 .5 32.0 −35.4
Other cities 46.1 79.5 82.2 29.8 −7.7
Nation 100 100 100 22.9 −8.2
Electronics Percent share Annual percent growth
1990 2000 2006 1990–2000 2000–06
17 principal cities 87.9 80.8 78.9 12.8 −4.3
Border cities
Texas border 41.5 37.5 42.7 12.6 −1.8
California border 26.1 29.2 22.6 15.1 −8.0
Arizona border 11.9 6.5 7.1 7.0 −2.5
Interior cities
Border interior 7.2 6.9 6.1 13.3 −6.1
Distant interior 1.1 .6 .4 7.6 −9.5
Other cities 12.1 19.2 21.1 19.2 –2.4
Nation 100 100 100 13.8 −3.9
Transportation equipment Percent share Annual percent growth
1990 2000 2006 1990–2000 2000–06
17 principal cities 83.1 84.2 74.4 12.1 0
Border cities
Texas border 61.8 62.9 56.4 12.1 .3
California border 3.6 5.3 6.2 16.3 4.8
Arizona border 3.3 2.7 1.7 10.0 −5.8
Interior cities
Border interior 14.3 13.1 9.8 10.9 −2.6
Distant interior .2 .2 .3 15.5 5.3
Other cities 16.9 15.8 25.6 11.2 10.6
Nation 100 100 100 11.9 2.1
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the traditional locations and a 0.3 percent 
gain on the Texas border.    
Recession and the Border States
Maquiladoras on the U.S.–Mexico bor-
der were quickly drawn into the collapse 
of U.S. manufacturing in late 2008, which 
heavily affected the automobile and con-
sumer electronics sectors.
Ripples from maquiladora shutdowns 
quickly spread, bringing rapid and steep 
declines in formal-sector employment in 
northern Mexico’s five maquiladora border 
states.9 In each, maquiladoras are the domi-
nant factor in manufacturing, and manu-
facturing is a very large, if not dominant, 
segment of formal employment. 
The result has been 12-month employ-
ment declines through February that rival the 
losses of the 2001 recession, with Chihuahua 
down 10.4 percent, Baja California 7 percent, 
Coahuila 6.1 percent, Tamaulipas 5.3 percent 
and Sonora 4.4 percent (Chart 1). The fig-
ures far outstrip the 1.6 percent decline for 
all of Mexico over the same period. 
These job losses are reminders that Mexi-
co’s maquiladora industry remains closely tied 
to the U.S. economy. At the same time, the 
country’s embrace of freer trade has exposed 
the industry to the vicissitudes of the market-
place, bringing important shifts in maquila-
dora employment. We can anticipate further 
changes in maquiladora geography.  
Cañas is an associate economist and Gilmer a 
vice president in the El Paso Branch of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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